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Abstract
This article develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the effect of subsidies
on player salaries, competitive balance, club profits, and welfare. Within this model,
fan demand depends on win percentage, competitive balance, and aggregate talent.
The results show that if a large market club receives a subsidy and fans have a
relatively strong preference for aggregate talent, compared to competitive balance
and own team winning percentage, club profits and welfare increase for both clubs.
If the small-market club is subsidized, a small subsidy increases competitive balance
and player salaries of both clubs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Government subsidies are a common phenomenon in professional team sports. These
subsidies usually take the form of advantageous property deals1, tax loopholes2, and low
or zero stadium rents.3 As a result of these subsidies, some clubs enjoy cost advantages
over their competitors.
A special case of these cost advantages are income tax differences with respect to
player salaries. In France, there is a uniform income tax rate. As a result players in
the first French division face an income tax rate of 45% if their salary exceeds e150,000.
Monaco, on the other hand, does not impose income taxes. Accordingly, players from AS
Monaco, who also compete in the first French division, do not pay any income taxes.
In the US, state and city income tax rates also differ substantially. For example,
Florida and Texas do not impose state and city income taxes, whereas California charges
state taxes of up to 12.3%. The former coach of the Orlando Magic, Glenn Anton ”Doc”
Rivers, tried to convince free agents of opposing teams to join the Magic by yelling at
them during games, “We have no state and city taxes, and it’s always 80 degrees.”
Kopkin (2012) identifies the effect of changes in income tax rates on player transfers.
He finds that an increase in the marginal income tax rate for a given team results in a
decrease of the average skill of free agents who transfer to this team. Alm, Kaempfer,
Sennoga, and Batte (2012) analyze the same effect in professional baseball and show that
low tax cities benefit from a “home field advantage”in the free agent market. To the best
of our knowledge, these effects have never been analyzed in a game theoretical model of a
professional sports league. Our model builds on former models, which have focused on
competitive balance and win percentage (see e.g., Dietl, Lang, & Werner, 2009; Vrooman,
2008; Szymanski & Kesenne, 2004). We follow Madden (2012) by including the effect of
aggregate talent on demand. Unlike Madden, however, we explicitly model fan preference
for aggregate talent while he uses aggregate talent primarily as an additional factor in the
revenue function.
Based on our game theoretical model we show how subsidies affect player salaries,
competitive balance, club profits, and social welfare. The results show that if a large-
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market club receives a subsidy and fans have a relatively strong preference for aggregate
talent, compared to competitive balance and own team winning percentage, then club
profits and welfare increase for both clubs. If the small-market club is subsidized then a
small subsidy increases competitive balance and player salaries of both clubs.
Our model clearly deviates from classical gate revenue sharing models (cf., Szymanski
& Kesenne, 2004) because subsidies affect competitive balance and aggregate talent. In
classical revenue sharing models aggregate talent is not included. While in the classical
gate revenue sharing model competitive balance decreases we show several results in the
opposite direction. Additionally, several outcomes in our model result in an increasing
competitive balance.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the structure of the model.
Section 3 explains the equilibrium outcomes. Section 4 presents the results and explains
the intuition. Section 5 sums up the main arguments and proposes options for future
research.
2 MODEL SETUP
We model a two-club league in which both clubs participate in a noncooperative game and
independently pay a certain amount for player salaries to maximize profits. Each club
k ∈ {i, j} generates its own revenues according to a fan demand function that depends
on the match quality, i.e., own team win percentage, competitive balance, and aggregate
talent.4
We introduce the concept of exogenous assistance in the form of a subsidy. In the
Lang et al. (2011) model, outside actors financially assist clubs, thereby influencing a
club’s objective function. In our model, no outside actor has the possibility of influencing
a club’s objective function. One example in our case is a regional government that has its
own economic interests in supporting a club via tax relief but cannot directly influence
the club’s decision-making process.
The gross salaries (salary payments) of club k are denoted by xk and the net-of-tax
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salaries sk the players receive at club k are given by
sk = (1− µkt)xk
with t ∈ [0, 1] and µk ∈ [0, 1]. We assume xk > 0. The income tax is denoted by t and the
subsidy (tax relief) that club k obtains is presented by the parameter µk, where a higher
value of µk denotes a lower subsidy. For notational simplicity, we substitute the term
(1− µkt) with αk and obtain
sk = (1− µkt)xk = αkxk
with αk ∈ [1 − t, 1]. With the new notation, a higher parameter αk reflects a higher
subsidy. In the extreme case, αk = 1 and club k does not have to pay any taxes so that
the gross salaries the club pays corresponds to the net-of-tax salary the players receive,
i.e., sk = xk. In contrast, if αk = 1− t, club k does not receive any subsidy and has to
pay the full tax so that sk = (1− t)xk. While this setup assumes that any revenues from
a subsidy are passed on to the salary of the players, a more relaxed assumption is also
plausible. By assuming that both clubs i, j forward the same share of the subsidy to their
players we relax the general assumption that all tax revenues are forwarded.
Next, we specify the revenue function, which depends on win percentage, competitive
balance, and aggregate talent. Win percentage is most commonly represented by the
contest-success function (CSF). We select Tullock’s (1980) logit approach:
wk(xi, xj) =
sk
si + sj
=
αkxk
αixi + αjxj
,
with k ∈ {i, j}.5 We use the following measurement for competitive balance:
CB(xi, xj) = wi(xi, xj)wj(xi, xj) =
αixiαjxj
(αixi + αjxj)2
.
If both clubs have the same winning percentage (wi = wj = 0.5), competitive balance
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is 1/4. The opposite case, a league with one dominant club (wi = 1, wj = 0), has a
competitive balance of 0.
Fans value not only competitive balance but also aggregate playing talent within the
league.
AT (xi, xj) = αixi + αjxj.
Without aggregate talent, supporters are unable to distinguish between teams in a high or
low league (assuming that win percentages are the same). By including σ > 0 to measure
the relative importance of aggregate talent, the quality function of club k is
qk(xi, xj) = wk(xi, xj) + CB(xi, xj) +
1
σ
AT (xi, xj).
We assume that every supporter, denoted by υ, has a preference for a game’s quality,
denoted by θ. For simplicity, we assume that these preferences are uniformly distributed
in [0, 1]; that is, the measure of potential fans is 1.6 The payoff for a supporter is described
as the utility a supporter derives from attending a game, θυqk, minus the cost a supporter
has to pay for it, pk. We take for granted that a consumer’s payoff cannot be negative,
max{θυqk − pk, 0}. The consumer who is indifferent with respect to attending a game
(or, similarly, paying a television fee to watch the game) is described by θυ =
pk
qk
. Thus,
the number of supporters who are willing to attend a game at price pk is expressed by
1− θυ = qk−pkqk .
By assuming that each club has a market size or drawing potential given by mk > 0,
the aggregate demand function for club k is denoted by
dk(mk, pk, qk) = mk
qk − pk
qk
= mk(1− pk
qk
).
Thus, the club’s revenue function is
Rk = pk · dk(mk, pk, qk).
The optimal choice for a club to maximize earnings is to set pk =
qk
2
, which results in the
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following revenue function:
Rk =
mk
4
qk =
mk
4
(wk(xi, xj) + CB(xi, xj) +
1
σ
AT (xi, xj)).
Our revenue functions differ from the revenue functions of other papers, i.e., Szymanski
(2003), Vrooman (2007, 2008) because our revenue function depends on consumer pref-
erences for aggregagte talent. The revenue functions allow us to measure social welfare
consisting of club profits, consumer surplus, supporter surplus, and player salaries.
Profit pik for club k is given by revenues Rk minus gross salaries (salary payments) xk
pik =
mk
4
(wk(xi, xj) + CB(xi, xj) +
1
σ
AT (xi, xj))− xk.
Given that the maximal price consumers are willing to spend is pk = qk and that in
equilibrium, consumers have to pay a price of pk =
qk
2
, we receive the following aggregate
consumer surplus (CS):
CS = CSi + CSj with CSk =
∫ qk
qk
2
m
qk − pk
qk
dpk =
m
8
qk, k ∈ {i, j} so that
CS =
1
8
(mqi + qj).
Net-of-tax player salary is given by sk = (1 − µkt)xk = αkxk and aggregate player
salary by PS = si + sj. We calculate aggregate club profits in the same way: pii + pij.
The social planner receives (1− αi)xi and (1− αj)xj as taxes. With all four components
social welfare is7
W (xi, xj) = pii + pij + CS + αixi + αjxj + (1− αi)xi + (1− αj)xj,
With pii = Ri − xi social welfare reduces to
W (xi, xj) = Ri +Rj + CS.
We have thus defined all our main variables: competitive balance, aggregate talent,
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club profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. In the next section we calculate the
equilibrium outcomes.
3 EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES
For notational simplicity, we normalize mj = 1 and write mi = m. To maximize profits,
each club chooses the optimal salary payment x∗k. Thus, the clubs’ optimization problems
are maxxi≥0 pii and maxxj≥0 pij with the corresponding first-order conditions
∂pii
∂xi
= 0.25
−4σ(xiαi + xjαj)3 +mαi((xiαi + xjαj)3 + 2σα2jx2j)
σ(xjαj + xiαi)3
= 0,
∂pij
∂xj
=
αj(xiαi + xjαj)
3 + 2σ(x2iα
2
iαj − 2(xiαi + xjαj)3)
σ(xjαj + xiαi)
= 0,
and second-order conditions8
∂pi2i
∂x2i
= − 3mx
2
jα
2
iα
2
j
2(xiαi + xjαj)4
< 0 and
∂pi2j
∂xj2
= − 3x
2
iα
2
iα
2
j
2(xiαi + xjαj)4
< 0.
From the first-order conditions, we derive the equilibrium salary payments
x∗i =
αiαjm
2σ(αj − 4σ)
2(3mαiαjσ(αj − 4σ)− αjσβ +mαiβ(αj − 3σ)−m2α2i (αj − 4σ)(αj − σ)
,
x∗j =
mαi(αj(mαi − 4σ)(σ(3mαi + αj)−mαiαj) + β(3αjσ +mαi(σ − αj))
8σ2(mαi − αj)3 ,
with β = (mαiαj(mαi − 4σ)(αj − 4σ))1/2. To ensure non-negative equilibrium salary
payments, we assume from now on that the fan preference for aggregate talent is sufficiently
large, with σ < σ∗ = min{αim
4
,
αj
4
}.
Next, we derive the equilibrium win percentages:
w∗i =
1
1 +
αj(4σ−mαi)
(mαiαj(4σ−mαi)(αj−4σ))1/2
and w∗j =
1
1− mαi(αj−4σ)
(mαiαj(mαi−4σ)(αj−4σ))1/2
.
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Club profits in equilibrium are
pi∗i =
m2(4αjβσ +m
2α2i (6αjσ + 8σ
2 − 3α2j ) +mαiαj(2σ(5αj − 12σ)− 3β
32σ2(αj −mαi)2 ,
pi∗j =
2mαiαjσ(5mαi + 3αj) + 8αjσ
2(αj − 3mαi)− 3m2α2iα2j − 3mαiαjβ + 4mαiσβ
32σ2(αj −mαi)2 .
Consumer surplus in equilibrium is given by
CS∗i =
m(4αjσβ +m
2α2i (6αjσ + 8σ
2 − 3α2j )
64σ2(αj −mαi)2 +
mαiαj(2σ(5αj − 12σ)− 3β)
64σ2(αj −mαi)2 ,
CS∗j =
2mαiαjσ(5mαi + 3αj) + 8αjσ
2(αj − 3mαi)
64σ2(αj −mαi)2 +
−3m2α2iα2j − 3mαiαjβ + 4mαiσβ
64σ2(αj −mαi)2 .
Consequently, social welfare in equilibrium is
W ∗ =
3mαiαj(3mαi(5 +m+m
2) + αj(9 + 5m(1 + 2m))
64σ2(αj −mαi)2
+
8σ2(m3α2i (1 + 2m)− 3mαiαj(3 +m+m2) + 3α2j )− 3m2α2iα2j (3 +m+ 2m2)
64σ2(αj −mαi)2
+
mβ(9αiαj − 3mαiαj − 6m2αiαj + 12αiσ + 4αjσ + 8mαjσ))
64σ2(αj −mαi)2 .
In the next section we examine the effect of a subsidy on the equilibrium outcomes.9
4 EFFECTS OF SUBSIDIES ON EQUILIBRIUM
OUTCOMES
In this section we discuss the implications of our results step by step. First, we explore
the consequences of a subsidy αi ∈ (αj, α∗i ) for club i on its salary payments.10
Proposition 1 Suppose club i receives a subsidy. Increasing the subsidy always increases
the salary payments of club i, while it increases the salary payments of club j if and only
if the subsidy is not too large. Otherwise, a subsidy for club i reduces salary payments of
club j. Formally, ∂xi
∂αi
> 0 ∀αi ∈ (αj, 1) and ∂xj∂αi > 0⇔ αi ∈ (αj, α∗i ) with α∗i =
16αjσ
m(3αj+4σ)
.
Proof. See Appendix
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To explain Proposition 1, we use Figure 1, which displays subsidies on the x-axis and
salary payments on the y-axis. The dotted line denotes the large club. The solid line
denotes the small club. Panel A shows the case when a large club receives a subsidy.
Panel B shows the case when a small club receives a subsidy.
[Figure 1 near here]
A club’s profit depends on its win percentage, competitive balance, and aggregate
talent. When a club receives a subsidy, it will always invest it. If the club, which does
not receive a subsidy, is small, it mainly benefits from aggregate talent. As competitive
balance decreases the small club cannot profit from it. If the club, which does not receive
a subsidy, is large, it can benefit from both aggregate talent and competitive balance.
On the left side of Figure 1, both clubs invest in salary until the subsidy reaches a
limit. Once the subsidy reaches a limit only the large club invests in salary. The small
club decreases investment in salary.
As shown on the right side of Figure 1, the salary investment of the large club, which
does not receive the subsidy, first increase and then decrease. The salary investment
for the small club increases. In both cases (left and right side in Figure 1) the salary
payments for the subsidy receiving club always increase.
The following proposition analyzes the effect of subsidies on win percentage.
Proposition 2 Suppose club i receives a subsidy. Increasing the subsidy always increases
the win percentage of club i and decreases the win percentage of club j. Formally, ∂wi
∂αi
> 0
and
∂wj
∂αi
< 0 ∀αi ∈ (αj, 1).
Proof. See Appendix
The proposition shows that a higher subsidy has an unambiguous effect on win
percentages. Thus, even if club j increases salary payments as a result of a subsidy lower
than the subsidy of club i, this increase is overcompensated for by an increase in the
salary payments of club i.
Next, we examine the effect of subsidies on competitive balance.
Proposition 3 Suppose club i receives a subsidy. If club i is the large club, increasing
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the subsidy always decreases competitive balance. If club i is the small club, increasing the
subsidy increases competitive balance if and only if the subsidy is not too large. Otherwise,
a subsidy for the small club decreases competitive balance. Formally, ∂CB
∂αi
< 0 ∀αi ∈ (αj, 1)
for m > 1 and ∂CB
∂αi
> 0⇔ αi ∈ (αj, αCBi ) with αCBi = αjm for m < 1.
Proof. See Appendix
To explain Proposition 3, we use Figure 2, which displays competitive balance.
[Figure 2 near here]
The effect of a subsidy on competitive balance depends on which club receives the
subsidy. If one club dominates the league, competitive balance is comparably low. When
a (small or large) club benefits from a subsidy, the club’s salary payments will increase
as the club has more funds available. If the large club receives a subsidy, competitive
balance will decrease as the large club’s salary payments further increase in relation to
the salary payment of the small club. The opposite holds true for the small club: An
increasing subsidy leads to higher salary payments of the small club, resulting in a more
balanced league until a maximum. After the maximum, competitive balance decreases.
Figure 2 shows this case on the right-hand side. Additionally, a relatively high preference
for aggregate talent leads to lower (higher) competitive balance if the large (small) market
club receives a subsidy.
We derive the following numerical result for the effect of a subsidy on aggregate talent:
Result 1 Suppose club i receives a subsidy. Increasing the subsidy always increases
aggregate talent in the league if and only if the subsidy is not too large. Otherwise, a
subsidy for club i reduces aggregate talent. Formally, ∂AT
∂αi
> 0⇔ αi ∈ (αj, αATi ).
Proof. See Appendix.
If club i receives a subsidy, it will increase its salary payments. If the subsidy does not
exceed a certain threshold (see previous result), club j will have positive salary payments
as well. Club j also benefits from the subsidy through the increase in aggregate talent.
However, if the subsidy is too large, club j will considerably decrease its salary payments.
The additional salary payments of club i will then be lower than the decrease in salary
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payments of club j. Therefore, aggregate talent decreases. In the next result, we analyze
how a subsidy affects club profits.
Result 2 Suppose club i receives a subsidy. Increasing the subsidy increases the profits of
club i if and only if the subsidy is not too large. The opposite is true for club j: increasing
the subsidy for club i increases the profits of club j if and only if the subsidy is sufficiently
large. Formally, ∂pii
∂αi
> 0⇔ αi ∈ (αj, αpii ) and ∂pij∂αi > 0⇔ αi ∈ (αpij , 1).
Proof. See Appendix.
To explain Result 2, we use Figure 3, which displays subsidies on the x-axis and club
profits on the y-axis. The dotted line denotes the large club. The solid line denotes the
small club. Panel A shows the case when a large club receives a subsidy. Panel B shows
the case when a small club receives a subsidy.
[Figure 3 near here]
In panel A we see the case when the large club receives a subsidy leading to an increase
in salary payments. Accordingly, this increase leads to a more unbalanced league (effect
on competitive balance). Nevertheless, the small club benefits from the increase of salary
payments because of an increase in aggregate talent.
In panel B we see the case when the small club receives a subsidy. The subsidy will
lead to an increase in salary payments. A small subsidy leads to an increase in competitive
balance while a large subsidy leads to a decrease in competitive balance. Aggregate talent
increases for both a large and small subsidy and almost always has a positive effect on
revenues. The small club’s increase in salary payments is smaller than the decrease in the
large club’s salary payments. We see in panel B that a very large subsidy decreases the
profit of the small club (see Appendix for proof).
Next, we examine the effect of subsidies on social welfare. We derive the following
numerical finding:
Result 3 Suppose club i receives a subsidy.
(a) If supporters have a high preference for aggregate talent, increasing the subsidy
always increases social welfare (see left panel of Figure 4), i.e., ∂W
∂αi
> 0 ∀αi ∈ (αj, 1) for
10
σ < σ∗.
(b) If supporters have a low preference for aggregate talent, increasing the subsidy
increases social welfare if and only if the subsidy is not too large, i.e., ∂W
∂αi
> 0 ⇔ αi ∈
(αj, α
W
i ) for σ > σ
∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
To explain Result 3, we use Figure 4, which displays subsidies on the x-axis and social
welfare on the y-axis. Panel A shows the case when supporters have a high preference for
aggregate talent (thus 1
4
≤ σ ≤ 1
2
). Panel B shows the case when supporters’ preference
for aggregate talent is comparatively small (i.e., 1
4
< σ).
[Figure 4 near here]
Panel A shows that aggregate talent (almost) always increases through higher subsidy
(kink in aggregate talent seems not to have an effect, see Figure 5 in the Appendix). If
preference for aggregate talent is sufficiently high, then this effect dominates all other
effects. Panel B shows that the social planner must be more careful when setting
the subsidy if supporters have a low preference for aggregate talent. This means that
competitive balance is more important for the generation of revenues. In this case, social
welfare first increases as the subsidy increases until a maximum level is reached. Increasing
the subsidy beyond this optimum level leads to a reduction in social welfare. To clarifly
the results from the previous proofs all effects are summarized in Table 1.
[Table 1 near here]
4.1 Analysis when winning percentage is not weighted
In this scenario we assume that the quality function of clubs depends only on competitive
balance and aggregate talent. This means that the weight for winning percentage is = 0.
This quality function models a league which generates most of its revenues from the sale
of television rights like the NFL.
Salary payments
11
When the large-market club receives a subsidy then salary payment decreases for
the large-market club and increases for the small-market club. The intuition is that
the revenue of both clubs depend on competitive balance. Thus, the large-market club
decreases its own revenue when salary payments lead to a more unbalanced league. This
is different in the case when winning percentage and competitive balance are equally
weighted. Salary payments for the large-market club increase (left side of Figure 1).
When the small-market club receives the subsidy then salary payment decreases for
the large-market club and increases for the small-market club. Thus, both clubs aim to
increase competitive balance. Once the amount of salary payment is equal the opposite
reaction occurs. This is, to some extent, similar to the case when aggregate talent and
competitive balance are equally weighted. However, in this case salary payments for the
large-market club first increase before they decrease.
Club profits
Profits always increase for the club which receives the subsidy and decrease for the
club which does not receive the subsidy. When winning percentage is weighted profits
also increase for the club which does not receive the subsidy (cf., Figure 3). However,
once the subsidy is too large then only one club benefits from the subsidy. This is then
similar to the case of the analysis when winning percentage is not weighted.
Social welfare
When the large-market club receives a subsidy, social welfare always decreases. A
larger subsidy exacerbates this tendency. Fan preference for aggregate talent has only a
minor influence. However, when the small market club receives the subsidy social welfare
increases up to a maximum before declining again. Social welfare only declines when the
subsidy for the small-market club is too large. Again, this result is different from the case
when winning percentage is weighted because social welfare is influenced by fan preference
for aggregate talent.
12
4.2 Analysis when competitive balance is not weighted
In the following scenario we assume that the quality function of clubs depends only on
winning percentage and aggregate talent. This means that the weight for competitive
balance is = 0. Examples of a league with such characteristics is the European Champions
League or Europa League. Competitive balance is not the driving force in these leagues
like European soccer leagues, which means, winning percentage and aggregate talent
determine club profits.
Salary payments
When the large-market club receives a subsidy salary payments for both clubs increase.
However, once the subsidy is too large both clubs’ payments sharply decrease. Both clubs’
invest because their revenue depends on winning percentage and aggregate talent. This
is different from the case when winning percentage and aggregate talent are weighted
equally (left side of Figure 1).
When the small-market club receives a subsidy, salary payments for both clubs increase.
However, once the subsidy is too large both clubs payments sharply decrease. Again, this
result is different when winning percentage is weighted (right side of Figure 1).
Club profits
When the large-market club receives a subsidy, the profits of only the large-market
club are increasing (left side of Figure 5). In the case when competitive balance is weighted
a subsidy for the large-market club leads, to some extent, an increase in profits for both
clubs (right side of Figure 5). This result is clearly different from the present case.
When the small-market club receives the subsidy, the profit of only the small-market
club increases. This is different in the case when aggregate talent and winning percentage
are equally weighted. Then the subsidy is positive for both clubs (to some extent). Even
the large-market club benefits although the small-market club receives the subsidy (right
side of Figure 3).
[Figure 5 near here]
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Social welfare
Social welfare decreases when the small-market club receives a small subsidy. When
the subsidy is considerably large then social welfare increases. This is different in the case
when competitive balance is weighted. Social welfare depends on whether fans have a
high preference for aggregate talent. In this analysis fan preference for aggregate talent
has only a minor influence.
When the large-market club receives a subsidy, social welfare always increases. Again,
this is different for the case when winning percentage and competitive balance are equally
weighted. The driving force for social welfare is fan preference for aggregate talent. When
fan preference for aggregate talent is high a subsidy always increases social welfare.
5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Four parts of our model are especially interesting for policy makers: competitive balance,
aggregate talent, club profit, and social welfare.
We show that competitive balance significantly changes when one club receives a
subsidy. When a large-market club receives a subsidy, competitive balance decreases.
When a small-market club receives a subsidy, competitive balance first increases but
decreases when the subsidy is too large. Thus, when a policy maker wants to set the
socially optimal competitive balance, he has to limit the amount of the subsidy that a
small-market club receives.
Managing the amount of a subsidy is an effective policy instrument to influence
aggregate talent in a league. Increasing the amount of the subsidy increases aggregate
talent until a maximum is reached. Increasing the subsidy above this talent-maximizing
level decreases aggregate talent in the league. Thus, it is important for the policy maker
to find the optimal amount of subsidy to maximize aggregate talent in a league.
Club profit depends on win percentage, competitive balance, and aggregate talent.
We describe for policy makers two situations regarding club profits. One scenario is
when fans have a low preference for aggregate talent. Aggregate club profit increases
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only when competitive balance increases,which means that the small-market club should
be subsidized. In the second scenario, fans have a high preference for aggregate talent.
Aggregate club profit increases only if the large club receives a subsidy. Thus, it is
important for a policy maker to identify whether fans have a high or low preference for
aggregate talent.
Aggregate club profits increase when the large-market club receives the subsidy and
fans have a low preference for aggregate talent. When the small market club receives the
subsidy, aggregate club profits decrease. When fans have a high preference for aggregate
talent then a subsidy for the large-market club increases aggregate profit. However, a
subsidy for the small-market club first increases aggregate profit but when the subsidy is
too large, aggregate profit decreases.
We assume that a policy maker in the decision making process primarily wishes to
increase win percentage and tax revenues. A subsidy for a large-market share club always
decreases competitive balance while a subsidy for a small-market share club has ambiguous
effects. The subsidy for the small-market club results in higher salary payments which
ultimately effect the win percentage of both clubs. When a maximum is reached (i.e., a
balanced league), further increasing the subsidy decreases competitive balance.
Our model provides essential policy implications regarding social welfare. While
common intuition says that a subsidy is beneficial for only the subsidy receiving club,
our model shows that a different interpretation is appropriate. When supporters from
both clubs have a high preference for aggregate talent, both clubs can benefit in terms of
profit. However, when supporters have a low preference for aggregate talent, social welfare
depends mainly on competitive balance and win percentage. Thus, when a subsidy results
in a more unbalanced league, social welfare decreases.
6 CONCLUSION
The aim of this article is to develop a game-theoretic model that analyzes how subsidies
influence a professional team sports league. In addition to win percentage and competitive
15
balance, the model includes fan preference for aggregate talent. The paper examines how
subsidies influence salary payments, competitive balance, club profits, and social welfare.
Future research can weigh competitive balance, win percentage, and aggregate talent
differently. Additionally a similar setting in a league where clubs are win or utility
maximizers may yield interesting results.
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Notes
1The European Commission states that the Spanish soccer club, Real Madrid ”appears
to have benefitted from a very advantageous real property swap with the City of Madrid.”
(see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-13-1287 en.htm)
2See e.g., Barcelona CF, Athletic Club Bilbao. For them the European Commission
states that they might have received ”Possible privileges regarding corporate taxation.”
3One example for stadium rent is the Dutch soccer club Willem II (see http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release IP-13-192 en.htm ). Clubs that might have benefited by paying no or
lower rent for their training facilities are FC Den Bosch and MVV (these are also Dutch
soccer clubs).
4Dietl & Lang (2008) use a similar approach but without the inclusion of aggregate
talent. Aggregate talent is included in a different way in the models of Dietl, Lang, &
Rathke (2009) and Madden (2011).
5Note, it is not the gross salary xk but the net-of-tax salary sk that determines the
playing talent, and, in turn, the win percentage.
6For more detail, see Dietl et al. (2009), and Falconieri, Palomino, & Sakovics (2004),
who use a similar approach.
7Note that (1− αk)xk = µktxk.
8Second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied because
∂pi2i
∂x2i
< 0 and
∂pi2j
∂xj2
< 0.
9A benchmark case (when the tax subsidy is symmetric) does not yield different results
compared with no subsidies.
10An equivalent proposition can be derived if club j receives the tax break.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
To proof the claim in Proposition 1, we proceed as follows. First, we show that the subsidy
always increases the salary payments of club i if this club receives a subsidy, i.e.,
∂x∗i
∂α∗i
> 0
∀αi > αj. We compute
∂x∗i
∂αi
= 0⇔ α = {α1, α2} with
αi1 = −m(αj − 2σ) + (m(αj − 4σ)(αj − σ))
1/2
m2
αi2 =
−m(αj − 2σ) + (m(αj − 4σ)(αj − σ))1/2
m2
We have αi < 0 and αj > 1. Moreover,
∂x∗i
∂αi
> 0⇔ α ∈ (αi, αj). Thus, we conclude that
∂x∗i
∂α∗i
> 0 ∀αi ∈ (αj, 1), which proves the claim.
Second, we show that subsidy for club i increases the salary payments of club j if and
only if the subsidy is not too large, i.e.,
∂x∗j
∂αi
> 0⇔ αi < α∗i = 16αjσm(3αj+4σ) . We compute
∂x∗j
∂αi
= 0⇔ α = α∗i =
16αjσ
m(3αj + 4σ)
.
Moreover, we derive limαi→0
∂x∗j
∂αi
= m
2αj
> 0 and thus
∂x∗j
∂αi
> 0⇔ αi < α∗i , which proves the
claim.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Competitive balance is defined as
CB(xi, xj) = wi(xi, xj)wj(xi, xj) =
αixiαjxj
(αixi + αjxj)2
so that competitive balance in an equilibrium is
CB∗ =
1
(1− ( mαi(αj−4σ)√
mαiαj(mαj−4σ)(αj−4σ)
)(1 + (
αj(4σ−mαi)√
mαiαj(mαi−4σ)(αj−4σ)
)
.
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Recall that large values of CB characterize a more balanced league. The most balanced
league - a league with two equally strong clubs - has a maximum value of 0.25.
Next, we compute
∂CB∗
∂α∗i
> 0⇔ αi < αCBi =
αj
m
.
Note that αCBi < αj for m > 1 and α
CB
i > αj for m < 1.
(a) Suppose that club i is the large club with m > 1 so that αCBi < αj. Given that club
i receives the subsidy, it holds αi > αj and thus αi > α
CB
i . We conclude that
∂CB∗
∂α∗i
< 0
∀αi ∈ (αj, 1), i.e., competitive balance in the league decreases.
(b) Suppose that club i is the small club with m < 1 so that αCBi > αj. Given that
club i receives the subsidy, it holds αi > αj and thus by increasing the subsidy the league
becomes more balanced for all αi ∈ (αj, αCBi ) and less balanced for all αi ∈ (αCBi , 1).
Formally, ∂CB
∂αi
> 0 if αi < α
CB
i and
∂CB
∂αi
< 0 if αi > α
CB
i . This completes the proof of
Proposition 2.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
To show that a subsidy for club i always increases the win percentage of club i and
decreases the win percentage of club j, we proceed as follows. We derive
∂w∗i
∂αi
=
2αjσγ
αi (−mαiαj + 4αjσ + γ)2
,
∂w∗j
∂αi
= − 2m
2αiαjσ(αj − 4σ)2
γ (−mαi(αj − 4σ) + γ)2
,
with γ =
√
mαiαj(mαi − 4σ)(αj − 4σ). So that mαiαj(mαi − 4)(αj − 4) > 0. It is
straightforward to show that
∂w∗i
∂αi
> 0 and
∂w∗j
∂αi
< 0 ∀αi ∈ (αj, 1).
A.4 Proof of Result 1
To prove the claim of Result 1, we have to rely on numerical simulations. We set
m = 0.5;αj = 0.01;σ = 0.5. Solving the maximization problem maxαi∈(αj ,1)(x
∗
i +x
∗
j) yields
αATi = 0.038 and thus
∂x∗i+x
∗
j
∂αi
> 0 ⇔ αi ∈ (αj, αATi ). Thus, a higher subsidy for club i
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always increases aggregate talent in the league if and only if the subsidy is not too large.
This completes the proof of Result 1.
To explain Proof of Result 1, we use Figure 6 that displays subsidies on the x-axis and
aggregate talent on the y-axis.
[Figure 6 near here]
A.5 Proof of Result 2
To prove the claim of Result 2, we have to rely on numerical simulations again. We set
m = 0.5;αj = 0.01;σ = 0.5: (i) Solving the maximization problem maxαi∈(αj ,1) pi
∗
i yields
αpii = 0.038 and thus
∂pii
∂αi
> 0 ⇔ αi ∈ (αj, αpii ). (ii) Solving the minimization problem
minpi∗j yields α
pi
j = 0.02 and thus
∂pij
∂αi
> 0 ⇔ αi ∈ (αpij , 1). Thus, part (i) shows that a
higher subsidy for club i always increases the profits of club i if and only if the subsidy is
not too large. Part (ii) shows that a higher subsidy for club i increases the profits of the
other club j if and only if the subsidy is sufficiently large,
A.6 Proof of Result 3
To prove the claims of Result 3, we have to rely on numerical simulations again. We set
m = 0.5;αj = 0.01;σ = 0.5. The maximization problem maxαi∈(αj ,1)W
∗ has no interior
solution and thus ∂W
∂αi
> 0 ∀αi ∈ (αj, 1) for σ < σ∗. Thus, increasing the subsidy always
increases social welfare if supporters have a high preference for aggregate talent.
Second, we set m = 0.5;αj = 0.01;σ = 2. Solving the maximization problem
maxαi∈(αj ,1)W
∗ yields αWi = 0.015 and thus
∂W
∂αi
> 0⇔ αi ∈ (αj, αWi ) for σ > σ∗. Thus, if
supporters have a low preference for aggregate talent, increasing the subsidy increases
social welfare if and only if the subsidy is not too large.
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Figure 1 - Salary Payments
Panel A: Subsidy for large club Panel B: Subsidy for small club
——— Small club - - - - - Large club
Figure 2 - Competitive Balance
Panel A: Subsidy for large club Panel B: Subsidy for small club
Figure 3 - Club Profits
Panel A: Subsidy for large club Panel B: Subsidy for small club
——— Small club - - - - - Large club
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Figure 4 - Social Welfare
Panel A: High preference Panel B: Low preference
Figure 5 - Profit when large-market club receives a subsidy
Panel A: CB not weighted Panel B: CB weighted
——— Small club - - - - - Large club
Figure 6 - Aggregate Talent
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Table 1 - Results overview
Subsidy for
large-market, effect on small-market, effect on
large-market small-market large-market small-market
Salary payments + ambiguous ambiguous +
Win percentage + - - +
Competitive balance - ambiguous
Aggregate talent ambiguous ambiguous
Club profits + ambiguous ambiguous ambiguous
Social welfare ambiguous ambiguous
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